whats stupid about revealing that your satellites can take pictures of missiles being launched, as they claim they can ? Theyve released such imagery plenty of times in the past, for example showing much smaller Hamas missiles at the point of ignition. And the Russians were happy enough to release their satellite imagery . Revealing that your satellites can take detailed photos isnt exactly going to come as a surprise to many people.
You really should try reading previous posts in this thread on the subject and applying some critical thinking.
Has it ever occurred to you that the US intelligence in this case is a dataset of IR targets and plume trajectories and distinct patterns (platform specific signatures) of geolocated radio emissions? This has been
discussed previously. There are most likely no convenient 'photos' (IR let alone visible) for the mainstream media to get excited about or Joe Public to gawp at, argue over the date and time they were actually taken (see below). Try not to confuse it with the IDF still and video imagery of Hamas missile launches in Gaza purposefully taken from IR systems on surveillance drones and other planned, tailored overflights by the Israeli military. SBIRS is quite a different approach to data gathering. Just as the presentation of radar data is a representation of a situation and not imagery of the regional sky (see below).
And explain exactly what was comedic about the Russian presentation ?
As regards the Russian Ministry of Defence presentation let's recap the key points:
1. The presented
flight route ("air corridor") represented on their map neither matches the filed flight plan or feeds of the in flight ADS-B data (eg
flightradar24), ie the actual route taken. This was discussed in detail in
post 674.
2.
IR satellite imagery shows indistinct targets indicated to be BUK launchers but no one can corroborate the dates and times at which these were taken and no such supporting evidence is provided. They depict blurred objects in a field at a (claimed) moment in time.
3. Rather pointless
bar charts of 'radar activity' which contribute slightly less to the sum of knowledge than a powerpoint slideshow at a pyramid scheme investors meeting.
4. Let's not forget the
social media images they threw in at the end to pad out the presentation. A sadly not very convincing half-hearted claim as to the location of the transporter which was easily debunked by a little detective work (eg
here and
here).
5. A
chart of the route of MH17 (MAS17), two other commercial flights in the region (SIA351, AIC113) and a supposed Su-25. I'm not sure who had the idea to paste in the mismatched plane graphics (RC135/707 instead of 777, MiG-23 instead of Su-25) - perhaps the intern they got to throw it together was gently mocking them? Irrespective, the paths of the objects of interest don't tie in with the air traffic situation they subsequently provide. Which brings us to…
If you insist.
6. The Air Traffic Management (ATM) presentation. Note that this is a presentation of the situation ("air control information on air situation") and not raw radar data. The ATM hardware in question will almost certainly be a Vniira Sintez ATM system since the company makes it
quite clear on their website that they provide unified ATM systems and air traffic surveillance across Russia, in particular the Rostov-on-Don area (stated as the source of data by the presentation commentary "from the Rostov Aerial Centre of the Joint Air Traffic Management System"). These systems aim to reduce the workload on ATC staff by combining both primary surveillance radar (PSR) data with secondary surveillance radar (SSR), ADS-B, WAM and filed flightplan information from parallel flightplan processing systems (also provided by Vniira) in a representation of the situation compliant with Eurocontrol HMI standards. One key feature of which is to associate filed flight plans with the SSR returns and maintain this labelling to help the operator manage the airspace. This is known as 'track by plan' (represented by a diamond with selected information mixed from those sources in an accompanying box label - which can be seen for all three commercial flights in the area in the first frame grab in
post 628. Note each has a
predicted 'velocity vector', the straight line and a recent history, the trailing dots).
Importantly, the ATM system also handles transient data outages by coasting the SSR/ADS-B/WAM data (such a state being represented by a square), attempting to reconcile it with PSR paints (circles) and the published flightplan until data returns. This is a "pseudoradar" representation of what is going on (precisely
the words the vendor uses to describe the output of their product) and this is exactly what is being shown in the
video.
Of course, the ATM system isn't designed to track aircraft as they progressively break up into an increasingly complicated shower of pieces of dramatically varying radar cross-sections, evolving ballistically and quickly modified by both drag and the prevailing local wind profile. The algorithm driving the pseudoradar representation hunts forlornly, trying to reconcile the flightplan and this expanding confusion of rapidly changing PSR radar paints (witness how the representation of MH17 turns from a diamond to a square at the moment of destruction, as SSR/ADS-B/WAM are lost, with the 'velocity vector' line initially turning to the NE as the velocity abruptly drops, consistent with the upper atmosphere winds at the time, before wandering and the subsequent 'recent history' dots are all over the place - the coasting code simply isn't designed to cater for this). More than likely many of the weaker, transient, PSR returns (the real raw data) are discarded early in the processing chain filtered by the system to remove clutter/anaprop/noise/wildlife/signals having non-physical behaviour (ie outside the expected parameters of the target sought), etc (in other words, that which distracts from the ATM role). After a short time the system gives up trying to interpolate the 'track by plan' (the system drops the flightplan labelling). The presenter would appear to suggest you consider that the stronger of the concurrent PSR returns is a Su-25 that has suddenly appeared (as chance would have it, at the moment MH17 started to break up). Note the lack of altitude data for the paint in question (check the frame grabs) - it's basic PSR. All you are looking at is a misidentification of part of what's left of MH17. Either the presenter doesn't understand the ATM system or they are hoping their audience won't.
(To add - I don't doubt that if they do actually provide the raw radar data, and not some processed version of it, the air accident investigation report will acknowledge and refer to such but I wouldn't be surprised if the civilian data is the post processed output of the ATM chain and consequently contributes little to the picture. The head end raw signals and/or military PSR would be far more interesting. Let's see if that turns up in the report - it certainly wasn't part of the presentation.)
