To begin with, an implicit yet fundamental supposition behind Syriza’s strategy was the Habermasian illusion regarding European politics resting on a reasoned and unco- erced deliberation among equal interlocutors (Douzinas 2016; Kouvelakis 2016: 54). As confirmed by Yanis Varoufakis (2017) and Euclid Tsaklotos (2016), who were Syriza’s successive finance ministers in charge of the negotiations with the Greek creditors, Tsipras and his team thought that, because they had reason on their side, every well- meaning European sitting across the table would start to see the solution for the crisis in their way as the debt talks progress. What they completely disregarded are the relations of power – the actually existing politics in the actually existing EU, which includes the neoliberal establishment spearheaded by the German export lobby, who come with both their opposing interests and concomitant reasons, and the means to enforce them. This leads me to the second important point.