It's been referred to but no one has posted it up yet so .. i have reprinted the epilogue shortenned ( was too long) as i think it is the most significant bit , though it is based on the findings of the main report .. the highlights are mine .. the whole report should be read though to be honest ..
http://www.jrrt.org.uk/Far_Right_REPORT.pdf
3: Epilogue
by Jon Cruddas MP
Government strategy
The originality of New Labour lies in the method by which policy is not deductively produced from a series of core eco nomic or philosophical assumptions or even a body of ideas, but rather, is scientifically constructed out of the preferences and prejudices of the swing voter in the swing seat. It is a brilliant political movement whose primary objective is to reproduce itself – to achieve this it must dominate the politics of Middle England. The government is not a coalition of traditions and interests who initiate policy and debate; rather it is a power elite whose modus operandi is the retention of power. The last election produced a Labour majority of 66 which would disappear on a swing of just 2.5%. We have – even before the boundary shake out – some 40 plus super marginal seats that would change hands on a swing of about 5% or less. In short, the political priorities and concerns of a specific minority of swing voters in a highly select part of the country will become ever more dominant. At root the gearing of the electoral system empties out opportunities for a radical policy agenda. On the one hand, policy is constructed on the basis of scientific analysis of the references of key voters; on the other, difficult issues and the prejudices of the swing voter are neutralised. Labour have become efficient at winning elections and being in government yet within a calibrated politics where tenure is inversely proportionate to change.
As a politician for what is regarded as a safe working class seat the implications of this political calibration are immense. The system acts at the expense of communities like these – arguably those most in need. The science of key seat organisation and policy formation acts as a barrier to a radical emancipatory programme of economic and social change.
The pragmatic, incremental investment strategies of national government cannot begin to deal with a community undergoing such dramatic change as that occurring in Dagenham, with such an enduring legacy of need. Arguably it cannot even tread water in terms of investment strategies as lagged population statistics – which themselves underestimate real populations
– mean year on year budget increases way out in terms of the dynamic movement of people in global cities like London.
It is not just a question of quantitative resource distribution, however. The national policy agenda is calibrated for a different type of community which actively compounds our problems locally. For example, social housing is not a priority for swing voters in Middle England but is the burning issue locally; we resist the imposition of an academy so we are removed from the school capital programme as punishment; parent power undermines school leadership and the effective comprehensive strategy driven by the LEA; the language of choice heightens expectations but remains a fiction in terms of delivery. Alongside these quantitative and qualitative policy concerns operates the process of triangulation.
Specifically the way we have sought to neutralise negative political issues regarding race, immigration and asylum. The government has never attempted to systematically annunciate a clear set of principles that embrace the notion of immigration and its associated economic and social benefits.
Yet at the same time it has tacitly used immigration to help forge the preferred flexible North American labour market. Especially in London, legal and illegal immigration has been central in replenishing the stock of cheap labour across the public and private services, construction and civil engineering.
Politically, the government is then left in a terrible position. It triangulates around immigration and colludes in the demonisation of the migrant whilst relying on the self same people to rebuild our public and private services and make our labour markets flexible. Immigrant labour is the axis for the domestic agenda of the government yet it fails to defend the principle of immigration and by doing so re-enforces the isolation and vulnerability of immigrants. The government helps in the process of stigmatising the most vulnerable as the whole political centre of gravity moves to the right on matters of race.
For many of my constituents the value of their social wage is in decline.
House prices appear to rise inexorably upwards whilst thousands and thousands seek nonexistent, new social housing.
Public service improvements fail to match localised population expansion let alone the long term legacy of underinvestment.
At work their terms and conditions are under threat as they compete for work with cheap immigrant labour.
In terms of access to housing and public services and their position in the workplace many see immigration as a central determinant in their own relative impoverishment.
This remains unchallenged whilst the media and political classes help demonise the immigrant.
The cornerstone of New Labour has been the assumption that working class voters in communities like mine have nowhere else to go as they would never vote Tory. Yet this mixture of population movement and policy failure alongside the national discussion around race has meant that many are now developing a class allegiance with the far right.
24 T H E FAR RIGHT IN LONDON
Those communities that must accommodate the new immigrant communities are the ones least equipped to do so – they themselves have the most limited opportunities for economic and social mobility. Yet they remain disenfranchised due to the political imperatives of Middle England whilst political elites ramp up tensions in these very communities due to the way they triangulate around race. It is this mixture of class, poverty and race, together with policy issues around housing, public services and the labour market which has created such a rich seam for the BNP in Barking and Dagenham. Especially when we see a national debate around race and immigration that heightens tensions in our community. The government does not offer up solutions because it cannot deal with the rapid movements in people that is driving many of the local tensions over resources.
The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust research
It is within this context of rapid change and community tension that this key research by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust has been undertaken. Their research provides much needed insight into what is going on in London both through quantitative as well as focus group work into the motives behind voting patterns.
The findings are significant. By the 2004 European and London Assembly elections they conclude it is legitimate to argue that both UKIP and the BNP have entered the political mainstream rather than being fringe players, with complex linkages between the two parties.
The most important findings relate to why people are voting BNP, emerging out of focus group research in Barking and Dagenham. A widespread disillusionment with all the traditional political parties is found but this is especially directed at Labour who no longer represent their interests. This disillusionment is specifically linked to immigration – the dominant political issue in these communities.
The research grounds the popularity of the BNP in the material realities of the community – stretched public services especially in terms of public housing, economic insecurity and pessimism for the future. Immigration has come to symbolise a more fundamental belief in a deeper malaise in the country overseen by the mainstream political classes.
Most importantly it offers no comfort to those in the Labour Party who see the solution as one of ever more hardline policy positions on immigration and asylum – these are seen as election stunts. Both main parties are seen as deliberately boosting patterns of immigration whilst pretending otherwise.
The political formation in Dagenham is a complex one and the sheer rate of change extraordinary. In many respects it is beyond the power of the state, everything else being equal, to keep pace with such shifts and adapt public policy accordingly. Yet everything else is not equal. The imperatives of Middle England serve to disenfranchise communities like these. The policy agenda fitting the preferences of Middle England turns in on itself in the more traditional working class community. Some argue these are simply the systemic problems of centre left governments who seek to retain power against the backdrop of a hostile media. This benign interpretation of New Labour cannot be extended to their technical triangulations around the lives of migrants which has helped in the contemporary demonisation of the migrant.
This research by the Reform Trust provides insights into the consequences of this politics in terms of the rise of the BNP. Some might comfortably conclude that the sheer scale of the change occurring in Barking and Dagenham, due to its location in London, means that there are no generalised conclusions to be drawn regarding the BNP. It is a unique combination of forces.
Alternatively, one might argue that all of the factors behind the rise of the BNP in the Borough exist in working class communities across the country and this research helps us understand how they can combine to trigger extremism – especially in the context of any future economic downturn.
http://www.jrrt.org.uk/Far_Right_REPORT.pdf
3: Epilogue
by Jon Cruddas MP
Government strategy
The originality of New Labour lies in the method by which policy is not deductively produced from a series of core eco nomic or philosophical assumptions or even a body of ideas, but rather, is scientifically constructed out of the preferences and prejudices of the swing voter in the swing seat. It is a brilliant political movement whose primary objective is to reproduce itself – to achieve this it must dominate the politics of Middle England. The government is not a coalition of traditions and interests who initiate policy and debate; rather it is a power elite whose modus operandi is the retention of power. The last election produced a Labour majority of 66 which would disappear on a swing of just 2.5%. We have – even before the boundary shake out – some 40 plus super marginal seats that would change hands on a swing of about 5% or less. In short, the political priorities and concerns of a specific minority of swing voters in a highly select part of the country will become ever more dominant. At root the gearing of the electoral system empties out opportunities for a radical policy agenda. On the one hand, policy is constructed on the basis of scientific analysis of the references of key voters; on the other, difficult issues and the prejudices of the swing voter are neutralised. Labour have become efficient at winning elections and being in government yet within a calibrated politics where tenure is inversely proportionate to change.
As a politician for what is regarded as a safe working class seat the implications of this political calibration are immense. The system acts at the expense of communities like these – arguably those most in need. The science of key seat organisation and policy formation acts as a barrier to a radical emancipatory programme of economic and social change.
The pragmatic, incremental investment strategies of national government cannot begin to deal with a community undergoing such dramatic change as that occurring in Dagenham, with such an enduring legacy of need. Arguably it cannot even tread water in terms of investment strategies as lagged population statistics – which themselves underestimate real populations
– mean year on year budget increases way out in terms of the dynamic movement of people in global cities like London.
It is not just a question of quantitative resource distribution, however. The national policy agenda is calibrated for a different type of community which actively compounds our problems locally. For example, social housing is not a priority for swing voters in Middle England but is the burning issue locally; we resist the imposition of an academy so we are removed from the school capital programme as punishment; parent power undermines school leadership and the effective comprehensive strategy driven by the LEA; the language of choice heightens expectations but remains a fiction in terms of delivery. Alongside these quantitative and qualitative policy concerns operates the process of triangulation.
Specifically the way we have sought to neutralise negative political issues regarding race, immigration and asylum. The government has never attempted to systematically annunciate a clear set of principles that embrace the notion of immigration and its associated economic and social benefits.
Yet at the same time it has tacitly used immigration to help forge the preferred flexible North American labour market. Especially in London, legal and illegal immigration has been central in replenishing the stock of cheap labour across the public and private services, construction and civil engineering.
Politically, the government is then left in a terrible position. It triangulates around immigration and colludes in the demonisation of the migrant whilst relying on the self same people to rebuild our public and private services and make our labour markets flexible. Immigrant labour is the axis for the domestic agenda of the government yet it fails to defend the principle of immigration and by doing so re-enforces the isolation and vulnerability of immigrants. The government helps in the process of stigmatising the most vulnerable as the whole political centre of gravity moves to the right on matters of race.
For many of my constituents the value of their social wage is in decline.
House prices appear to rise inexorably upwards whilst thousands and thousands seek nonexistent, new social housing.
Public service improvements fail to match localised population expansion let alone the long term legacy of underinvestment.
At work their terms and conditions are under threat as they compete for work with cheap immigrant labour.
In terms of access to housing and public services and their position in the workplace many see immigration as a central determinant in their own relative impoverishment.
This remains unchallenged whilst the media and political classes help demonise the immigrant.
The cornerstone of New Labour has been the assumption that working class voters in communities like mine have nowhere else to go as they would never vote Tory. Yet this mixture of population movement and policy failure alongside the national discussion around race has meant that many are now developing a class allegiance with the far right.
24 T H E FAR RIGHT IN LONDON
Those communities that must accommodate the new immigrant communities are the ones least equipped to do so – they themselves have the most limited opportunities for economic and social mobility. Yet they remain disenfranchised due to the political imperatives of Middle England whilst political elites ramp up tensions in these very communities due to the way they triangulate around race. It is this mixture of class, poverty and race, together with policy issues around housing, public services and the labour market which has created such a rich seam for the BNP in Barking and Dagenham. Especially when we see a national debate around race and immigration that heightens tensions in our community. The government does not offer up solutions because it cannot deal with the rapid movements in people that is driving many of the local tensions over resources.
The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust research
It is within this context of rapid change and community tension that this key research by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust has been undertaken. Their research provides much needed insight into what is going on in London both through quantitative as well as focus group work into the motives behind voting patterns.
The findings are significant. By the 2004 European and London Assembly elections they conclude it is legitimate to argue that both UKIP and the BNP have entered the political mainstream rather than being fringe players, with complex linkages between the two parties.
The most important findings relate to why people are voting BNP, emerging out of focus group research in Barking and Dagenham. A widespread disillusionment with all the traditional political parties is found but this is especially directed at Labour who no longer represent their interests. This disillusionment is specifically linked to immigration – the dominant political issue in these communities.
The research grounds the popularity of the BNP in the material realities of the community – stretched public services especially in terms of public housing, economic insecurity and pessimism for the future. Immigration has come to symbolise a more fundamental belief in a deeper malaise in the country overseen by the mainstream political classes.
Most importantly it offers no comfort to those in the Labour Party who see the solution as one of ever more hardline policy positions on immigration and asylum – these are seen as election stunts. Both main parties are seen as deliberately boosting patterns of immigration whilst pretending otherwise.
The political formation in Dagenham is a complex one and the sheer rate of change extraordinary. In many respects it is beyond the power of the state, everything else being equal, to keep pace with such shifts and adapt public policy accordingly. Yet everything else is not equal. The imperatives of Middle England serve to disenfranchise communities like these. The policy agenda fitting the preferences of Middle England turns in on itself in the more traditional working class community. Some argue these are simply the systemic problems of centre left governments who seek to retain power against the backdrop of a hostile media. This benign interpretation of New Labour cannot be extended to their technical triangulations around the lives of migrants which has helped in the contemporary demonisation of the migrant.
This research by the Reform Trust provides insights into the consequences of this politics in terms of the rise of the BNP. Some might comfortably conclude that the sheer scale of the change occurring in Barking and Dagenham, due to its location in London, means that there are no generalised conclusions to be drawn regarding the BNP. It is a unique combination of forces.
Alternatively, one might argue that all of the factors behind the rise of the BNP in the Borough exist in working class communities across the country and this research helps us understand how they can combine to trigger extremism – especially in the context of any future economic downturn.
