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China versus India - The New Cold War

Rimbaud

Well-Known Member
Surprised that there is no thread yet on the Doklam stand off between China and India.

Here's a brief breakdown of the situation.

1- A successful India represents an existential and ideological threat to the CCP, as it undermines the historical narrative they promote of a China-centric world order being the norm. A protracted period of Indian growth outstripping Chinese growth will also prove that the CCP are not miracle workers, and that their draconian rule is not an inevitable outcome of having a large population.

2- China is on the verge of a serious economic crisis caused by over-investment in real estate and rapidly ballooning debt. Attempts to balance the economy towards a consumer economy have mostly been abandoned in favour of delaying the crash through growing the national debt while tightening censorship and ideological controls, building a personality cult, and promoting an increasingly militarist nationalism. This is my own reading, but it looks very much like the CCP hopes to weather the coming economic crisis through tight control of the narrative and placing responsibility elsewhere. Further to this, India is now the place of choice for a large supply of cheap labour, and China's industrial base is in decline as a result.

3- "One Belt One Road" is Xi Jinping's big project, designed to deal with China's overcapacity problem by building a series of infrastructure projects across central Asia, South East Asia, and Africa. This is at the same time an attempt to build a China-centric world order, and has attracted criticism and suspicion that its real aim is to indebt weak countries to China, and use infrastructure to transport raw materials out of countries involved and transport Chinese products into the countries involved. East India Company Mk 2, essentially. Pakistan, India's arch-enemy, is China's key ally in this because through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor China can have easy access to the Indian ocean through a deep sea port it is funding in Pakistan's restive Balochistan province. China has pissed off India by building infrastructure projects in regions of Kashmir claimed by India without any consultation from India, only from Pakistan.

4- India has provoked China's ire by boycotting One Belt One Road, and teaming up with China's arch nemesis Japan to promote a competing Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. The two countries have also came into competition in the Indian Ocean with a naval build up and rivalry in port projects and influence over Sri Lanka.

5- The Chinese leadership seems to have miscalculated in Doklam, an area of Bhutan claimed by the Chinese. This is strategically important because it gives China the "high ground" militarily above the area where a relatively thin part of land separates North East India from the rest of the country. China started building roads in the area, in an echo of the so called salami slicing strategy used in the South China Sea - slowly and imperceptibly changing the status quo (e.g. through island building) and then claiming sovereignty. India has called China's bluff by blocking the construction of the road, and their troops have clashed with Chinese troops. No shooting yet, but fist fights and stone throwing between the two coutries' armies.

Neither side can back down without losing face, and both Modi and Xi are ambitious leaders with a lot to lose. It is pretty difficult to see how this is going to wind down, and it seems like it is escalating if anything, with India responding in recent days by strengthening its control over the Indian Ocean and the Chinese Navy carrying out rare "live fire drills." Given the wider geo-political conflicts of interest between the two countries, (especially with regards to OBOR and AAGC, China's alliance with Pakistan, and Indian's alliance with Japan) is this shaping up to be the Asian cold war of the 21st Century? And could we blunder into WW3 this way?

The big thing to look at is the upcoming BRICs conference in Xiamen. If India boycotts it, that would be a huge loss of face for Xi and a serious escalation which would be difficult to go back from. Also of significance is where Russia will stand - it traditionally has good relations with India, and at the moment it is a close ally of China, but they have had a hostile relationship in the recent past. Most likely it will strive to stay neutral, but both India and China will be attempting to drive a wedge between each other's relationship with Russia.
 
China has pissed off India by building infrastructure projects in regions of Kashmir claimed by India without any consultation from India, only from Pakistan.
A lot of people don't realise that Kashmir is split into three parts. Or the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

Still not feeling it. Too much to lose. Think the BJP are trying to keep the USA happy.
 


I don't know if anyone has seen this bizarre attempt at soft power. A state which bans satire probably shouldn't bother attempting political humour, this video is the inevitable result.
 
I don't know if anyone has seen this bizarre attempt at soft power. A state which bans satire probably shouldn't bother attempting political humour, this video is the inevitable result.
The States that don't ban satire aren't that much better to be fair.

Maybe non state is better.
 
have been looking into this as well , will review when i get time and post some stuff. There are some translated (badly) policy documents slopping about i should dig into but are truly terrible reads.Yer right through about China looking to rope as many other countries into their plans to ease the impact the the mooted downturns . Now Pakistan is the real dark horse in this game- from what i see, China really thinsk they can get a foothold in Pakistan- lots of potential for empire building lite.

eta,the scuffles on the border are just that, literally jostling and pushy-shovee btween the troops- China are using these jostles to make formal announcements - * appeals for calm* - at a diplomatic level
 
Both China and India rely on export industries. They are both at the mercy of the buyers.

they account for almost half the worlds population- export is one facet, the internal demand is huge and increasing at absurd levels. You cannot view these economies in the traditonal third/ second world ( urgh) sense, these populations are not the unspohisticated ex-colonial backwaters of yore- they consume eagerly
 
they account for almost half the worlds population- export is one facet, the internal demand is huge and increasing at absurd levels. You cannot view these economies in the traditonal third/ second world ( urgh) sense, these populations are not the unspohisticated ex-colonial backwaters of yore- they consume eagerly

Sorry, but that reads as being very racist.

They consume like any other nation consumes. Population isn't really an issue here. The issue is that the 'traditional' export markets have died. China no longer relies on the West, but doesn't really have a viable alternative. No matter how much they would like to be a 'self-sufficient' nation, it just isn't maintainable without a healthy export market.

India is in much the same position, but has diversified a little more effectively.

Both are still heavily reliant on export to countries which have become saturated.
 
They consume like any other nation consumes.

Could you expand on this a little? I hope this doesn't come across as too very racist, but are there not stacks and stacks of ways in which patterns of consumption vary between different nations, for stacks and stacks of complex reasons?
 
Sorry, but that reads as being very racist.

They consume like any other nation consumes. Population isn't really an issue here. The issue is that the 'traditional' export markets have died. China no longer relies on the West, but doesn't really have a viable alternative. No matter how much they would like to be a 'self-sufficient' nation, it just isn't maintainable without a healthy export market.

India is in much the same position, but has diversified a little more effectively.

Both are still heavily reliant on export to countries which have become saturated.

This is the problem that China has ran into - attempts to reduce reliance on the West by creating an economy more reliant on domestic consumption have resulted in depleting foreign currency reserves and FDI flows going to India instead. Classic case of race to the bottom - the answer, of course, is building a global proletarian movement, but this is literally impossible so long as the CCP hold power. Any sort of political organisation, especially involving international solidarity, is incredibly dangerous there.

Big interesting thing about China from the perspective of Marxist economy is how big online shopping and mobile banking are. Cash is rapidly disappearing from Chinese society. (this also ties into an abominable Orwellian/Brookerian surveillance society based on a combination of AI, state control of education, news, and social media, and insidious use of "social credit" apps that reward snitches and punish people for associating with dissidents... but this is a different, albeit chilling, issue) In a year or two when the crisis really hits, I reckon you'll all be hearing a lot about the role of online shopping in precipitating the economic crisis - there has been a huge amount of investment in real estate, and commercial property used for shopping malls and so on, but the rise of online shopping has meant that a lot of these shopping malls are totally empty. Wanda, one of the biggest Chinese companies, is in serious debt trouble lately, largely because of building massive shopping malls in small towns of China which online shopping has made totally unviable commercially. Traditional shopping is dying, and so huge spanking new commercial districts across China are totally dead. The real estate financial apocalypse cannot be very far away - I predict early 2018. Xi is continuing to increase deficit spending to stave it off for a little longer so he can get through the big 5-yearly Party Conference in November, but after that's done it is a matter of months.
 
Opinion: China Miscalculated How To Handle India, Allowed Face-Saving Exit
http://www.ndtv.com/opinion/china-miscalculated-how-to-handle-india-allowed-face-saving-exit-1743081
So it appears that India won the standoff - China is not building the road and has withdrawn back to the previously agreed borders, and India has pulled back too allowing China to claim victory, minimising the damage to Xi Jinping.

This is quite a big blow to China, as it has showed that China's bark is worse than its bite - so it may find that it faces stiffer resistance from Vietnam, Phillipines, Singapore etc in the South China Sea. It has also seriously damaged the relationship between India and China, and the competition between the two states is likely to intensify in future.

China Miscalculated How To Handle India, Allowed Face-Saving Exit

To the considerable relief of all parties involved, India and China agreed yesterday to end a 74-day stand-off by their security forces near the trijunction with Bhutan. India initiated the announcement with a short statement that simply said that an "expeditious disengagement of border personnel...has been agreed to and is ongoing." China confirmed that India had withdrawn border personnel. Its spokesperson added that Beijing would "continue to exercise its sovereignty and uphold its territorial integrity" and reportedly that its forces "will continue to patrol in Doklam region." Beijing acknowledged that "adjustments" would be made on the ground.

A lot was left unsaid, and deliberately so. China did not say that its own troops had fallen back or that it was calling off the road building activities in the disputed territory that had provoked the stand-off. Equally - and more importantly - Chinese officials did not confirm that road building would continue or deny a disengagement of forces. Affairs had been choreographed so that both sides could claim victory. China was satisfied with Indian forces withdrawing to their prior positions to the west. But India accomplished its objective of ensuring that China would cease road building to its south.

The Doklam situation has provoked a host of commentary, much of it ill-informed, in part due to uncertainty and initially vague reports about its exact location, the competing legal claims made by China, Bhutan, and India, and the extraordinarily harsh rhetoric by China's officials and state media leading to concerns about escalation. But three questions remain. Why did the situation come about? Why did it end? And what might be the long-term consequences?

The exact reasons and timing for China's actions which precipitated the impasse on June 16 may never be known. Construction activities meant to strengthen China's position in disputed territory have become a common practice, including in the South China Sea. It is also now clear that China's leaders miscalculated, and did not anticipate an Indian intervention as their forces pushed forward in territory disputed with Bhutan. Speculative theories that China intended to teach a lesson to India - including possibly for its boycott of the Belt and Road Initiative - do not withstand scrutiny, given that events unfolded at a site where India had natural advantages.

The reasons for the stand-off's conclusion are easier to fathom. China had attempted to threaten and cajole India through public messages, mocking videos, and travel advisories intended to limit Chinese tourists from traveling to India. None of that worked. Indian forces were also better positioned on the ground, with more robust supply lines than their Chinese counterparts. The forthcoming BRICS Summit in the south-eastern Chinese city of Xiamen risked being overshadowed. It would have been awkward and embarrassing for China to welcome an Indian prime minister as a guest even as Indian forces were present in (what Beijing believes to be) Chinese territory. Finally, the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was looming, and an unresolved stand-off with India risked having domestic political ramifications. For these reasons, it was in Beijing's interest to ensure an early resolution to the stand-off, assuming a face-saving formula could be found.

What are the consequences? In the near future, it heralds a return to some possible normalcy in India-China relations. The two sides demonstrated that, despite the rhetoric, a peaceful and diplomatic solution could be found. But the long-term implications will be more uncertain. India has shown considerable resolve, not just in an effort to protect its own security interests but those of its neighbours. China, meanwhile, has done considerable damage to its reputation in India, less by precipitating the problem, and more by its poor handling of the situation. Whether on the border or beyond - in other domains, including regional security, multilateral affairs, or economic and trade relations - it would not be surprising if New Delhi was to approach its relations with Beijing with greater wariness. Particularly following its behaviour on the South China Sea, it would be natural for India not to trust Chinese promises on the disputed frontier, but to continue to remain vigilant.

If the Chinese state has hurt its reputation, so has the press, which did not acquit itself very well over the course of the past two months. The Chinese media resorted to ugly taunts and uglier threats. The Indian media, while more tepid, was often speculative and sometimes wildly misleading. Both the Indian and the international media were particularly insensitive in their portrayal of Bhutan, whose government proved admirably level-headed in what was an extraordinarily delicate and occasionally tense situation. But even the resolution of the impasse produced confident interpretations by journalists who lacked both immediate information and broader context.

Doklam shows that a military confrontation between two nuclear-armed powers can be resolved diplomatically, and without escalation. But for China's leadership there is perhaps a need for introspection about why it let relations with India deteriorate so sharply for no material gain.
 
http://thediplomat.com/2017/09/the-truth-about-chinas-indonesia-south-china-sea-tantrum/

This is a consequence of the Doklam standoff - Indonesia signalling to China that it is willing to defend its exclusive economic zone.

If this is the beginning of a trend in the South China Sea, expect there to be some sort of action by China to signal that its threats are not just bluffing.



The Truth About China’s Indonesia South China Sea Tantrum
Beijing’s displeasure is all too predictable and far from convincing.

thediplomat_2015-01-27_18-57-02-36x36.jpg

By Prashanth Parameswaran
September 06, 2017
Last week, media outlets began disclosing that China’s Foreign Ministry had sent a note dated August 25 to the Indonesian Embassy in Beijing opposing Jakarta’s decision in July to rename its portion of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea. Despite the hype surrounding the note, it represents just the latest sign of China’s well-known and predictable displeasure at Indonesia’s decision to protect its maritime interests lawfully in response to Beijing’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Though Indonesia is technically not a claimant to the South China Sea disputes strictly speaking – a point its diplomats are keen to emphasize – in reality, as I have noted before, it has nonetheless been effectively an interested party, especially since China’s nine-dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the resource-rich Natuna Islands.

Given the balance that Indonesia has had to walk, the South China Sea position Jakarta has adopted since the 1990s might be best summed up as what I have termed a “delicate equilibrium” – seeking to both engage China diplomatically on the issue and enmeshing Beijing and other actors within regional institutions (a softer edge of its approach, if you will) while at the same time pursuing a range of security, legal, and economic measures designed to protect its own interests (a harder edge) (See: “Indonesia’s South China Sea Policy: A Delicate Equilibrium”).

Though China’s growing maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea – which, quite apart from initiating any sort of “cooling down period,” includes a string of actions from continuing to trumpet its nine-dash line to infringing into the waters of Southeast Asian states to pressuring regional and extraregional states to cease their perceived ‘intervention’ into the South China Sea issue – has not led to a fundamental change in Indonesia’s long-held policy for various reasons thus far, there have been signs of recalibration as Jakarta has sought to do what it can to protect its interests (See: “Will Indonesia’s South China Sea Policy Change Amid China’s Assertiveness?”).

Indonesia’s stance following run-ins with Chinese vessels, its upgrading of facilities in the Natunas, visits by Jokowi to the area, and Jakarta’s North Natuna Sea renaming, are all examples of this broader trend (See: “Why Did Indonesia Just Rename its Part of the South China Sea?”). They are specific actions designed to signal to China and other states that Indonesia intends to secure its own interests with respect to this issue even as it, like other Southeast Asian states seeks closer ties with Beijing in other areas.

With respect to the North Natuna Sea renaming, China’s temper tantrum – which Indonesian diplomats say has been expressed through several ways including the recent diplomatic note – has been predictable. Beijing has a habit of coercing other claimants, regional, and extraregional states over the South China Sea issue through a wide range of measures, from instituting economic limits to exports of certain products to canceling diplomatic engagements to either routinely or sporadically sending vessels into the waters of neighboring states to make its point (See: “Will a China-ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct Really Matter?”). Seen from this perspective, China’s suggestion in its recent diplomatic note that the renaming complicates and expands the dispute and affects peace and stability is nothing new.

And besides, even a cursory examination would demonstrate that China’s huffing and puffing over the North Natuna Sea renaming is much ado about very little. Unlike Beijing’s nine-dash line and its refusal to adhere to the arbitral tribunal ruling on the Philippines’ South China Sea case issued in 2016, Jakarta’s outlining of the steps it is taking in the renaming – including steps like registering it with the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) – have so far been completely in line with international law.

Indonesia is also just the latest among Southeast Asian states to move forward with this designation (the Philippines already calls the South China Sea the West Philippine Sea, and Vietnam refers to it as the East Sea). And though Jakarta has publicly stated that there are several reasons behind this name change, considering that China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has clearly been a key reason for Jakarta’s move, Beijing only has itself to blame for this. It is just another example of how Chinese assertiveness is leaving Southeast Asian states with little choice but to initiate countermeasures in response to protect their own interests while becoming even more aware of the challenges posed by Beijing’s rise even as the opportunities continue to be clear as well (See: “New White Paper, Old Asia Conundrum”).

Thus, it is quite clear that Beijing’s suggestion in its recent note that Indonesia is undermining “peace and stability” and jeopardizing Sino-Indonesian ties and progress on the South China Sea issue does not pass the smell test. As one Indonesian source told The Diplomat, though there might be a debate as to the positions of various sides, “we can at least be clear about sequences of events here.”

Lastly, despite expressing its clear displeasure at Indonesia’s renaming, China is also no doubt aware that moves like these do little to alter the balance of power that remains massively in its favor. Though legal moves like this one are important signaling devices in and of themselves as they convey the commitment of states to the very international laws Beijing is violating, they alone cannot stop China’s assertiveness unless they are paired with actions in other areas as well, including in the military and even the economic realm (See: “Beware the Illusion of South China Sea Calm”). And the reality is that Indonesia’s military capabilities remain quite limited, and Jakarta has refrained from taking firmer steps to confront Beijing because of the Jokowi government’s desire to preserve cooperation in other areas. We have seen few signs of this changing anytime soon.
 
Isn't one of China's problems that the inevitable sanctions which would take place if they took military action over the legally agreed border would cripple their economy?
 
So it seems the Indian and Japanese counter to China's One Belt One Road is getting underway now, with India looking to open up a direct shipping route to Vladivostok, going past the East Coast of China via Japan. It would appear Russia is wary of Chinese influence in the East, and is looking to India in an effort to diversify the region to balance it out.


Chennai-Vladivostok sea route: India's effort to counter China's OBOR could soon get a big Russian helping hand

NEW DELHI: Aiming to put in place a key maritime route connecting India with Northeast Asia and Western Pacific region Delhi is contemplating to put in place a major connectivity initiative — direct shipping link between Chennai and Vladivostok amid China’s ambitious Maritime Silk Route (MSR) connecting Asia with Africa.

With India making concrete moves to expand its presence in Far East Russia to harness natural resources as evident through Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Vladivostok last week plans are in making for a maritime link connecting Chennai with the key Russian port on the Pacific. This shipping link would enable to transfer cargo between Chennai and Vladivostok in 24 days in comparison to over 40 days currently taken to transport goods from India to Far East Russia via Europe, according to experts on the subject.

This proposed maritime route which could be transformed into a corridor could juxtapose with Indo-Japan Pacific to Indian Ocean
Corridor amid Beijing’s OBOR of which MSR is a part – virtually connecting entire SE Asia through road, shipping and rail links.

Swaraj met top Russian Ministers from Putin’s cabinet – Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Industry Minister Denis Manturov, Natural resources Minister Sergei Donskoi and Deputy PM & President’s envoy for Far East Yury Trutnev besides governors of provinces in the region to further India’s role amid Moscow’s aim to diversify options besides China. South Korean President and Japanese PM were present at the Far East Forum that saw senior level representation (Swaraj) from India for the first time. Few months back Russia announced visa-free entry for Indians in its Far East.

On the occasion Swaraj also launched Russia Desk for facilitating Russian investments into India as assured by PM Narendra Modi during the annual summit in St Petersburg in June. This is the 3rd such Desk in India after Japan and Korea. Russia Desk would provide complete support service for any kind of Russian investment/ Businessmen/ from legislative to taxation; from personnel to finding right partner, according to informed officials.

The Far Eastern Federal District (twice the size of India) is the largest but the least populated of the eight federal districts of Russia, with a population of roughly 6.3 million. Russian affairs experts who did not wish to be identified indicated to ET that Moscow is sensitive to growing Chinese presence in Russia's Far-eastern region particularly increasing population from China which are settling there. "This pattern could change demographics of Far-east Russia and growing presence of other countries including India will help to bring balance," pointed out an expert.

India was the first country to establish a resident Consulate in Vladivostok in 1992. Current engagement of India with the region is limited to isolated pockets such as the Irkut Corporation in Irkutsk where the Mig and Sukhoi aircraft are built and over USD 6 billion worth of investments by ONGC Visesh Limited in the Sakhalin 1 project, according to persons familiar with the issue.

The region has a wealth of natural resources such as land, timber, mineral and other resources like tin, gold, diamonds and oil and natural gas. The Russian government has announced several initiatives to attract investments in the region, including an agricultural SEZ, the Vladivostok Free Port Project and also invites participation in the timber industry , mining of the huge mineral resources (coal & diamonds) and precious metal deposits (gold, platinum, tin and tungsten).
Read more at:
Chennai-Vladivostok sea route: India's effort to counter China's OBOR could soon get a big Russian helping hand
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...ofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
 
Other related news:

India and Japan release a joint statement about cooperating in combating terrorism, namely Pakistani based. This seems to also be a dig at China, who has been blocking the designation of the leader of a Pakistani based militant group as a terrorist.

After BRICS, India-Japan joint statement names Pakistan-based terror groups Lashkar, Jaish - Times of India

India and Japan agree to deepen defense ties, and increase military cooperation with Australia and the USA. Japan is constructing a bullet train in India, and also investing in infrastructure projects in India's remote North East, part of which is claimed by China.

With China in mind, Japan, India agree to deepen defense
 
Recent updates in the East Asian power struggle.

Revival of the Quad - a military alliance between India, Japan, Australia, and USA. This was an idea of Bush's but fell by the wayside because Australia wanted to enjoy relations with both China and the USA. A more aggressive China under Xi Jinping combined with revelations of Chinese espionage in Australia and concerted attempts to export Chinese censorship and interfere in Australian academia, have gone a long way to changing minds, and now the military alliance is a reality.

Take Note: Asia's 'Quad' Is Back

China's OBOR project has ran into trouble, and there has been a bit of a backlash with many projects cancelled. However they have also moved to bring Afghanistan into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

http://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/obor-troubles-how-chinas-ambitious-silk-road-initiative-has-hit-massive-potholes-from-pakistan-to-tanzania/1011158/


http://www.dw.com/en/can-afghanistan-join-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/a-42094595


Trouble continues to brew between India and China in Doklam, with China increasing military presence and building up more infrastructure. Doklam phase II will test India more than phase I

Meanwhile, ASEAN leaders are meeting in India for Republic Day. Seeking closer ties to reduce independence on China seems to be an underlying theme. India plans closer Southeast Asia maritime ties to counter China
 
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I predict China will lose this great power struggle, mainly because it is a country ran by elderly former red guards who prevent information getting into the country, are violently intolerant of criticism and opposing opinions, and have a really poor understanding of how countries outside of China function, combined with an oversized view of China's centrality and importance in the world. They seem to sincerely believe that US allies like South Korea are secretly puppet states directly controlled behind the scenes by the USA, and that the CIA/FBI plays a similar role to the CCP in China - e.g, if the New York Times runs an expose on human rights abuses in China, they genuinely believe that the US government is behind it, rather than the NYT acting independently. Their fierce reaction to Norway because of the Nobel Prize being awarded to Liu Xiaobo is an example of this - they cannot conceive that the Nobel Prize committee is not controlled in some way by the Norwegian government, and so took it as a kind of act of aggression from Norway to China.

This explains some of their self defeating behaviour - by conducting espionage and infiltration activities in Australia, as well as attempting to buy people off or use financial clout to get companies to acquiese to their demands, they are attempting to construct a world order based on what they believe "soft power" to be, and how they believe America controls its allies - but the result is that Australia has now agreed to a military alliance with Japan, India and the USA which they previously turned down out of desire for close relations with China. The fact that South Korea, Japan, and NATO countries may have US bases based upon their own security considerations rather than being subjected to them as a kind of occupation contradicts the worldview of the Chinese leadership - in fact, the multilateral nature of NATO is beyond their comprehension and they understand it purely as a tool of American power. The term "sharp power" has been coined to describe their interpretation of "soft power." This misunderstanding is behind the failure of their policy in Taiwan, largely based on courting Guomindang officials and bullying or sanctioning those who oppose them. This has backfired, resulting in Taiwanese public opinion becoming increasingly soured on the PRC, and the relevance of the Guomindang to decline. In their conception, public opinion is decided and manipulated from above, as it is within the PRC, so they targeted Guomindang officials, believing public opinion will follow. Instead, those officials got voted out of office. Chinese propaganda sees the shadowy hand of the USA behind everything, and initially I assumed this was just pure propaganda; but because China regularly hurts its own interests by acting according to an assumption of the world being top-down and alliances being hierarchical relations of control suggests that it is also a sincerely held belief. Anecdotally, regular Chinese people also often share this assumption.

Beijing Can't Understand Taiwan's Democracy

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-01-24/how-sharp-power-threatens-soft-power


This misunderstanding of multilateralism and soft power means that Chinese power in relative terms has probably already peaked, or is close to peaking. Demographic challenges, (the baby boomers are retiring soon, and even though they have loosened the one child policy, increasing costs of housing etc means the birth rate is not increasingas hoped) environmental problems, (China is predicted to suffer serious water shortages by 2030 as a result of 80% of groundwater supplies being contaminated) the middle income trap (manufacturing jobs moving elsewhere for cheap labour) and huge amounts of bad debt which needs deleveraging will weigh heavily upon Chinese economic growth over the next two decades. The increasingly unfavourable international environment (largely of their own creation throughout the last 5 years of hubristic belligerence) will compound this problem, as it has created tighter cooperation between China's neighbouring countries with the goal of countering Chinese interests. India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, Nepal all grew faster than China last year, and Vietnam and Indonesia are also likely to close the gap over the next couple of decades. The collaboration between ASEAN, India, Japan, and Australia, with the support of the USA means that China's role in Asia is almost certain to decline - its share of GDP in Asia is already beginning to decline, in fact. An obsession with defending Chinese "sovereignty" (in reality, protecting the party-cult's grip on power from being eroded by international influences) limits the ability to form meaningful alliances or relationships with other nations. Because of this, India will be the dominant Asian power of this century, even if it is decades before the size of its economy catches up with China's.

BUT the real danger is that there is a very high chance of China attempting to invade Taiwan within the next few years. The mood in China now is one of triumphalism and nationalism. Under Xi Jinping, discussion within the Party has narrowed and absolute loyalty to one man is the order of the day, as opposed to the more collective leadership with some plurality of views which prevailed during the Jiang and Hu eras. The danger of this is that cooler heads warning about the dangers of invading Taiwan will be accused of lacking "positive energy" (an annoying obsession in recent years) and patriotism, and the hotheads will win out.

The CCP is aware of the serious challenges which will come to a head soon, and is hoping to consolidate its legitimacy to weather those storms. The 2021 centenary of the founding of the CCP is coming up, and they have two main goals - to abolish extreme poverty within China (largely by forcing people from areas without infrastructure for running water etc to move into the various ghost towns that have been set up, and I guess hoping that these will become economically viable if enough people are moved in) and to retake Taiwan. These achievements, in their thinking, will grant them the legitimacy to muddle through the coming decades with the promise of becoming the number one world power by the second centenary in 2049, if people just bear with them and maintain social stability as they get on with sorting out the aforementioned problems.

So there is this this symbolic time limit of 2021, and an aggressive and hubristic political environment domestically. Additionally, based on the CCP's recent behaviour in Hong Kong, they seem to have given up on wooing Taiwan with "one country two systems," and they recognise that Taiwanese public opinion is moving further away from reunification and even Chinese identity at all, a trend which is likely to continue. So the longer they leave it the harder it will become, and a military option for achieving reunification is really their only possible option.

Along the same lines, China has been increasing military spending for quite some time now, but due to demographic challenges coming to a head in the 2020s they will not be able to keep up those spending increases, and due to the changing international environment, Taiwan is likely to become increasingly capable of defending itself. The window for being able to take Taiwan back is small.

On top of that, there is also a leaked document showing that China plans to invade Taiwan by 2020, and in recent months they have continuously violated Taiwanese airspace, sent aircraft carriers and warships on patrol routes round the island, and taken action against a whole range of companies who list Taiwan as a country on their website. They have also unveiled new amphibious landing ships, and seem to be preparing to retake Taiwan.

China plans 2020 invasion: researcher - Taipei Times Plans to invade by 2020

PLA boosts amphibious fleet, with eye on Taiwan and South China Sea PLA boosting their amphibious fleet

Taiwan calls China's new aviation routes in Taiwan Strait irresponsibl Increasing attempts to intimidate Taiwan and undermine Taiwans sovereignty

'Economic blackmail': Zara, Qantas, Marriott and Delta Air Lines reverse position on Taiwan for fear of angering China Action against companies listed Taiwan as a country

Yuan Diplomacy: Panama Cuts Ties with Taiwan in Favor of the Mainland | JAPAN Forward Stepped up attempts to isolate Taiwan diplomatically

They will fail, I believe, or if they do succeed then the cost will be incredibly high, both in lives and to China's economy, standards of living, and position in the world. But, the environment in China now is as such that cool headed rationality will struggle to prevail wherever national pride is concerned. I feel about 80% confident that they will attempt to soon.

You heard it here first.
 
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